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1 Introduction
“Italian bonds are in the perfect storm at the moment. Real money investors are running away
and those using Italian bonds to finance will also be clearing the desk now”.
Financial Times 9th November 2011, “LCH Clearnet SA raises margin on Italian bonds”
Why did countries at the the periphery of the Eurozone (Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal and Spain) pay higher interest rates on public debt than countries in the
core during the recent financial crisis? Because the creation of a monetary union
has integrated the sovereign debt markets and eliminated the exchange rate risk,
two main factors may explain this: credit risk and liquidity.
Credit risk derives from the government’s probability of default. The weak
fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals of a country induce investors to ask higher
compensation for holding government debt because of the possibility of suffering
losses. In addition, fears of default and self-validating expectations may also drive
up yields of government securities issued by those countries that cannot print new
currency, as predicted by Calvo (1988), Cole and Kehoe (2000) and Corsetti and
Dedola (2016).
Liquidity is a broad concept, referred to in the traditional theories of Keynes
(1936) and Hicks (1962) as the capacity of an asset to store wealth and protect
its owner from a shortage of revenue, thus providing a means to smooth con-
sumption. Modern corporate finance distinguishes between market liquidity and
funding liquidity. Market liquidity is the facility to obtain cash by selling an asset;
when frictions in the secondary market make it difficult to find a buyer the market
liquidity is low and the price of the asset deviates from its fundamentals.1
1Favero, Pagano, and von Thadden (2010) and Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) disentangle
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This paper instead focuses on the role of funding liquidity, which is the ease
with which investors can obtain funding (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)). As
investors typically borrow against an asset, funding liquidity is considered the
ability of an asset to serve as collateral. I show that government bonds are the
prime collateral securities in the European market of repurchase agreements (re-
pos), which are becoming an essential source of funding for the banking system,2
especially since the onset of the crisis when the increase in counterparty credit risk
led to a shift from the unsecured to secured funding. This forced borrowing banks
to post securities in the interbank market, whose value exceeds the loan by a cer-
tain amount, the “haircut” (also called “initial margin” or “margin requirement”),
which is the metric that I employ to measure funding liquidity. Given the value
of an asset, the lower the haircut the larger the amount of cash that the borrower
can obtain by pledging the asset.
Prior to the crisis, the perceived safety of government bonds made them good
collateral to back banks’ debt, their repo haircuts were low and their function as
a medium of exchange compressed their yields. Nevertheless, I show that during
the crisis the emergence of sovereign risk led to rises in repo haircuts on peripheral
government bonds, reducing their liquidity and capacity to serve as collateral for
secured borrowing. The funding of investors shrank along the lines of the mecha-
nism emphasized by Gorton and Metrick (2012) for the US liquidity crisis in 2007
- 2008, leading to a drop in investment. In order to reduce the contraction of their
funding, leveraged investors shifted their portfolios towards the more liquid bonds
the impact of credit risk and market liquidity risk on the evolution of European government
bond yields.
2Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2014) find empirical evidence that in a large panel of countries
banks hold a sizable amount of government bonds because of their liquidity services.
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of the core, with lower haircuts, contributing to the widening of the yield spreads.3
In order to assess this conjecture, I analyze empirically the response of 10-
year Irish government bond yield to rises in the haircuts applied by LCH Clearnet
Ltd, the largest European clearing house. I identify a funding liquidity shock
using the narrative approach, by reading the circulars published by LCH Clearnet
Ltd concerning variations in haircuts; I employ the high frequency identification
method to address the issue of simultaneity between news in financial markets and
the haircut policy of the clearing house. The key identification strategy hinges
upon the delay between the announcement and the implementation of changes in
haircuts, which implies that haircuts respond to movements in financial variables
with one lag, but variations in haircuts affect financial variables instantaneously. I
also provide evidence that the funding liquidity shock is not anticipated by market
participants.
The impulse responses of vector autoregression and local projection models
exhibit a significant increase in government bond yield following a liquidity shock.
These results suggest that the returns on a security incorporate a “funding liquidity
premium”, in line with Bartolini, Hilton, Sundaresan, and Tonetti (2011), who find
that differences in the collateral values across asset classes contributes to explain
yield spreads in the US; Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2011), who show the emergence
of a basis between a security and a derivative with the same cash flow but with
different margin requirements; and Ashcraft, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2010), who
3Banks could alternatively pledge government bonds for ECB refinancing operations, espe-
cially after the introduction of fixed-rate full allotment tender procedures, but paying a higher
interest rate than the rate in the private repo market (see Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer
(2016)). This opportunity cost of borrowing from the ECB may explain why the share of gov-
ernment bonds on total pledged assets vis-a-vis the ECB diminished during the crisis (Cassola
and Koulischer (2016)).
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show the inverse relation between haircuts in repos with the Federal Reserve and
prices of the underlying collateral during the crisis.
Furthermore, this paper addresses the following question: How does a fund-
ing liquidity shock propagate to the real economy? I feed the funding liquidity
shock into a DSGE model with financial frictions calibrated for Ireland, building
on Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2017). Similarly to European
banks, investors choose to hold sovereign bonds as a way to store liquidity with
which finance future investment. Since they cannot pledge the future returns of
investment completely, the liquidity of their asset portfolio is crucial to determine
the amount of investment that can be funded. Thus, even if the returns on public
bonds are lower than those on private assets, investors can ease their funding con-
straint by borrowing against them.4 Nevertheless, a negative liquidity shock can
suddenly reduce the sovereign bond liquidity.
Several papers incorporate the liquidity friction proposed by Kiyotaki and
Moore (2012) into general equilibrium models, such as Kurlat (2013), Bigio (2015),
Shi (2015), Ajello (2016), Cui (2016), Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Kiy-
otaki (2017).5 These authors assume that privately issued assets are subject to
a resaleability constraint, which limits their liquidity, whereas government bonds
are perfectly liquid. I depart from this assumption and introduce two types of gov-
ernment bond with different degrees of liquidity, in the spirit of Hicks (1939, pag.
4This echoes Ho¨lmstrom and Tirole (1998), who show that firms that cannot pledge any of
their future income are willing to pay a premium on assets that are able to store liquidity and
help them in a state of liquidity shortage. In Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) government debt
enhances the liquidity of households by loosening borrowing constraints. In Ashcraft, Gaˆrleanu,
and Pedersen (2010) less liquid assets with higher haircuts are associated with higher returns
because investors can borrow less by pledging these assets and need to use more capital.
5Calvo (2012), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012) propose alter-
native ways to embed liquidity in macroeconomic models.
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146): long-term bonds that are subject to a liquidity constraint and short-term
bonds that are not. An exogenous liquidity shock is a tightening of the constraint
on long-term bonds, which increases the premium that investors are willing to pay
for holding short-term bonds. While those papers interpret the liquidity shock as
a change in market liquidity and a dry-up of liquidity in the secondary market,
in this model it is equivalent to a rise in the repo haircut capturing a change in
funding liquidity, akin to Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2011) and Ashcraft, Gaˆrleanu,
and Pedersen (2010).
The liquidity shock reduces the value of long-term bond and increases its yield
to maturity, consistent with the empirical evidence. In addition, it has a quantita-
tive large effect on macroeconomic variables and aggregate output and price level
fall, as observed in the data for the Irish economy during the crisis. In particular,
investment drops sharply since the liquidity shock lowers the amount of funding
that investors can obtain by pledging government bonds. Further, nominal fric-
tions and the zero lower bound (ZLB) prevent the real interest rate from becoming
negative and consumption declines.
Finally, I analyze an unconventional policy to alleviate the contractionary ef-
fect of the liquidity shock, since conventional monetary policy is constrained by
the ZLB. This policy consists of swapping illiquid government bonds for highly liq-
uid papers (short-term debt or money) through direct purchases or collateralized
loans in response to the liquidity shock. The liquidity friction in long-term bonds
breaks the irrelevance principle of Wallace (1981) and Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003) for open market operations, since the government exchanges liquid assets
for illiquid assets, thus modifying the composition of aggregate portfolio holdings
6
and mitigating the drop in investment and output.6 The size of the policy inter-
vention is calibrated to match the ECB intervention on the Irish bond market with
the expanded asset purchase programme (APP). Results suggest that this policy
is more effective in reducing the drop in output with a stronger action.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a picture of the
European repo market and the funding liquidity of peripheral government bonds
during the crisis. Section 3 examines empirically the impact of rises in repo haircuts
on government bond yield. Section 4 presents the model. Section 5 shows the
calibration and the results of the numerical simulations and Section 6 concludes.
2 Funding liquidity of government bonds
This section analyzes the European repo market during the crisis; it presents
evidence of the importance of liquidity services provided by sovereign bonds and
illustrates how the liquidity of peripheral government securities suddenly dried up.
Figure 1 exhibits the extraordinary expansion of the European repo market in
the last decade as reported by the the European Repo Market Survey.7 Repos
tripled in the run-up to the crisis and, after a short contraction between 2008 and
2009, recovered to their pre-crisis level, reaching around e3 trillion. The size of
6Although this intervention could be interpreted as the Operation Twist implemented by the
Federal Reserve in 1961 and 2011, the objective of this policy is to modify the liquidity of the
portfolios of the private sector rather than their maturity. Chen, Curdia, and Ferrero (2012)
introduce limits to arbitrage and market segmentation between short-term and long-term bonds
in the preferred habitat framework. Reis (2017) also evaluates the effect of Quantitative Easing,
assuming that short-term bonds are more liquid than long-term bonds, since they can be used
as collateral in the interbank market together with reserves. In his model the unconventional
monetary policy relaxes the constraint of banks by exchanging illiquid long-term bonds for liquid
reserves.
7See Appendix A.1 and A.2 for the definitions employed for repo contracts and a description
of the data sources.
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the European repo market is therefore considerable and close to that of the US
market8
Figure 1: European repo market (billions of euros)
Note: The figure shows the amount of repos in the liabilities of banks that participated
continuously in all the surveys (billions of euros), excluding repos transacted with the
European Central Bank as part of official monetary policy operations.
Source: European Repo Market Surveys (ICMA).
Figure 2 compares the dynamics of secured and unsecured borrowing in in-
terbank transactions using data from the European Money Market Survey of the
European Central Bank. There is a massive shift of banks’ funding from the unse-
cured to the secured segment, in particular after the onset of the global financial
crisis following the rise in counterparty credit risk.9
Furthermore, breaking down the repo market by types of arrangements we
8Acharya and O¨ncu¨ (2012) estimate the size of the US repo market to be about $4.4 trillion
in 2009 based on the average daily amount outstanding of the primary dealers repo financing.
9Looking at banks’ balance sheets, Table 3 in the Appendix ?? shows that repos are a con-
siderable share of European banks’ funding, especially for the largest financial institutions ac-
counting for between 9% and 14% of total liabilities, more than unsecured interbank deposits
and long-term debt.
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Figure 2: Interbank transactions in the European money market
Repos and unsecured borrowing (to-
tal turnover)
Shares of bilateral and tri-party
repos (in percent of the total)
Note: The figure shows the evolution of repos and unsecured borrowing in the European Money
Market as total turnover (left panel), and the shares of bilater CCP-cleared repos, bilateral
over-the-counter repos and tri-party repos in percent of total repos (right panel).
Source: European Money Market Surveys (ECB)
can observe that bilateral CCP-cleared repos steadily increased, while over-the-
counter bilateral repos declined. Tri-party repos account for a little share of the
market, in contrast to the US repo market where they are the largest component.
The enhanced role of clearing houses increases the importance of the quality of
collateral securities since they set repo haircuts as a function of the credit risk
of these securities. Thus, a change in the credit risk is reflected in variations in
haircuts affecting funding conditions in the European repo market.
Concerning the collateral composition, Figure 3 shows that government bonds
are the predominant securities, accounting for around 80% of the total collateral
pool. This share was stable during the crisis and represents a structural charac-
teristic of the European repo market, different to the US market where securities
9
issued by the private sector account for a larger share (Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and
Orlov (2014)). Looking at the composition of sovereign securities, German bonds
are the largest share, although their supply is lower than French and Italian bonds
(Eurostat (2013)). In addition, the share of Italian bonds dropped substantially
during the Eurozone crisis, from 10% in December 2010 to 7% in December 2011.
Figure 3: Share of collateral in the European repo market (in percent of the total)
Note: The figure shows the share of collateral securities in the European repo market (in
percent of the total).
Source: European Repo Market Surveys (ICMA).
The collateral composition of the European repo market reflects not only the
safety of securities but also their liquidity. Figure 4 shows the evolution of 10-year
government bond yields of peripheral countries (Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain)
and the haircuts applied on these securities by LCH Clearnet, the largest European
clearing house. Following the rise in bond yields and sovereign risk, haircuts on
10
Irish and Portuguese sovereign securities surged up to 80%, making those bonds
almost completely illiquid. Italian and Spanish bonds also experienced rises in
haircuts but these were more mitigated. However, it is also interesting to note
that the increase in haircuts on Italian bonds is associated with their decrease in
the share of collateral in the repo market (Figure 3).10
To summarize, European government bonds have become an essential liquid
instrument for banks, especially since the onset of the financial crisis, because
they are needed to pledge collateral securities as guarantee of repayment in order
to borrow on the interbank market. Therefore, their value incorporates a pre-
mium reflecting their capacity to serve as collateral. The increase in haircuts on
peripheral bonds reduced their liquidity premium, leading to a flight-to-liquidity
from the periphery to the core and increasing their required returns, which in turn
entailed additional rises in haircuts by clearing houses.
In the next section, I investigate empirically this liquidity spiral in the Irish
economy; the rich dynamics of the haircut applied by LCH Clearnet makes it
a good laboratory to study its impact on government bond yield. Furthermore,
Delatte, Fouquau, and Portes (2017) report the sell-off in Irish bonds during the
crisis driven by higher collateral requirements, quoting the following article from
Financial Times (“Irish Bond Yields Leap after Selling Wave”, November 10,
2010): “The dramatic sell-off in Irish bonds was driven by a fire sale of positions
by market participants who were unable to meet collateral requirements enforced
by LCH Clearnet - one of the biggest clearing house - on Wednesday morning.
Ireland’s bank were faced with an estimated $1 bn cash-call from LCH Clearnet
10In Armakola, Douady, Laurent, and Molteni (2016) we show that a similar pattern is ob-
served for haircuts applied by other major European clearing houses and the volume of repos is
concentrated in a few large clearing houses.
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as a result of its decision to require a deposit of 15 percent against all Irish bond
positions as indemnity against default. [...] In order to avoid the call, many other
banks and traders are dumping their bond positions, however.”
Figure 4: Yields (LHS) and haircuts (RHS) on 10-year government bonds
Note: The figure shows the evolution of 10-year government bond yields and haircuts applied
on these securities by LCH Clearnet for Ireland (top-left), Portugal (top-right), Italy
(bottom-left) and Spain (bottom-right).
Source: Bloomberg and LCH Clearnet website.
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3 Assessing the impact of a funding liquidity shock
I study the dynamic relationship between the haircut and Irish government bond
yield with a high-frequency Bayesian vector-autoregression (BVAR) model, in-
cluding the series of haircuts applied by LCH Clearnet Ltd on 10 year government
bonds (ht), the logarithm of 5-year sovereign CDS spread (CDSt) and the loga-
rithm of yield of 10-year government bonds (ydt), in order to deal with endogeneity
problems and reverse causality issues because CDS spread and government bond
yield spread over the German bonds are part of the information set used by this
clearing house to settle the level of haircuts.11 The inclusion of the CDS spread
as a measure of credit risk allows to disentangle the funding liquidity channel
from the credit risk channel and helps identify a funding liquidity shock. Data on
CDS spread and government bond yield come from Datastream and Bloomberg,
respectively.
The sample covers the period from 11/01/2010 to 12/01/2011 at daily fre-
quency. The sample size is due to the data availability on changes in haircuts and
is right censored to exclude the launch of the first 3 year LTRO on 8th December
2011. Other unconventional monetary policies, such as the Security Market Pro-
gramme (SMP) and the refinancing operations with full allotment, were already
active during this period, but their inception, which is likely to have an impact on
market sentiments, precedes the beginning of the sample.12
This exercise is close to the study of Pelizzon, Subrahmanyam, Tomio, and Uno
11See LCH. Clearnet (2011): http://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/groups/pdf/mmcg/Item_1_
LCH_Margining.pdf?0fe79f1cef93461dc22566a4e165db44.
12Ghysels, Idier, Manganelli, and Vergote (2017) find that the SMP was effective in reducing
yields of peripheral government bonds. Because of the scarcity of public available information
regarding the implementation of the SMP, I cannot control for it but we can expect that this
policy has dampened the impact of variations in haircuts on government bond yields.
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(2016), who analyze the dynamic relation between credit risk and market liquidity
on the Italian sovereign debt market. The authors find that this link is reinforced
above 500 basis points in the sovereign CDS spread, because of changes in haircuts
applied by LCH Clearnet. They also show that the threshold effect disappears after
December 2011, when the ECB started the 3-year LTROs, providing abundant
liquidity to the banking system, and conducted moral suasion to the European
clearing houses to limit the procyclicality of haircuts, loosening the link between
credit risk and market liquidity.
Let yt = [ht, CDSt, ydt]
′ the vector of endogenous variables and consider the
reduced form VAR
yt = Ac + A1yt−1 + ...+ Apyt−p + ut (1)
where Aj are 3 x 3 matrices of coefficients with p denoting the number of lags,
and ut is the 3 x 1 vector of reduced form residuals with ut ∼ (0,Σu). I set p =
4 but results are robust to a longer lag length. I adopt non-informative priors for
estimating the matrices of coefficients and covariance.13 Since the components of
ut may be instantaneously correlated (i.e. Σu could be not diagonal), I consider
the following structural VAR model with orthogonalized residuals
A0yt = A
∗
c + A
∗
1yt−1 + ...+ A
∗
pyt−p + t (2)
where A0 is the impact matrix, A
∗
j = A0Aj, and t are the structural shocks with
diagonal covariance matrix Σ. Reduced form residuals can be expressed as a linear
combination of structural shocks ut = A0t and Σu = A0ΣA0. Normalizing the
13Appendix B.2 reports the details of the estimation procedure.
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variances of the structural shocks to one (i.e. E(t′t) = I) gives
Σu = A0A
′
0
In order to impose the necessary restrictions on A0 to achieve the identifica-
tion of structural shocks, I apply a Cholesky decomposition of Σu, choosing A˜0
as a lower triangular matrix with positive elements on the main diagonal. The
recursive structure and zero restrictions on the contemporaneous coefficients find
justification in the procedure through which LCH Clearnet Ltd decides and com-
municates to its members variations in haircuts, which is key to identify a funding
liquidity shock. LCH Clearnet Ltd notifies all modifications in haircuts at the
close of business through the Repo Clear Margin Rate Circulars; so their revision
is applied one day after the publication of the Circulars. To give a sense of how
I proceed, Figure 13 in the Appendix B.1 reports an example of the Circular;
these documents provide information on the date of the announcement, date of
implementation and variations in additional margins required.
Thus, I place the haircut as the first variable in the BVAR model. This Choleski
ordering implies that the haircut does not respond within the period of impact to
financial shocks relative to CDS spread and yield, but a shock to the haircut is
allowed to affect CDS spread and yield instantaneously. This identification strat-
egy is based on a similar assumption employed in the empirical literature on fiscal
policy; that is, fiscal instruments do not react instantaneously to variations in
macroeconomic variables, mainly economic activity, because of the outside lag,
which is the delay between the decision and the implementation of a certain pol-
15
icy.14
Nevertheless, with low frequency data the implementations of fiscal policy can
be anticipated by private agents, leading to a non-fundamental moving average
representation (see Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2013), Ramey (2011), Mertens and
Ravn (2012), Favero and Giavazzi (2012)). In this application high frequency data
rule out the possibility that market participants may react to announcements of
changes in haircuts before their implementation. In this regard, it shares the High
Frequency Identification (HFI) approach for monetary policy shocks.15
Figure 5 presents the impulse responses to one standard deviation shock to
haircut The solid line denotes the median estimate of the impulse responses and
the dashed lines represent the range of the 90-percent confidence band around the
point estimates. The funding liquidity shock leads to a rise in government yield
which remains significant for around 35 days with the peak effect to 0.5 percent
after 14 days from the impact period. The funding liquidity shock also raises the
CDS spread, with the peak effect to 0.66 occurring after 16 days; the impact on
the CDS spread is more persistent than on yield. These results suggest that the
higher haircuts set by LCH Clearnet on Irish government bonds increased the yield
of government bonds and their credit risk as measured by CDS spread, which in
turn led to additional increases in haircut by the clearing house.
A possible issue for the identification of a funding liquidity shock is that market
participants can anticipate the decision of the clearing house to change the haircuts.
14Using different approaches Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fata´s and Mihov (2001) assume
that government spending is predetermined within the quarter imposing time restrictions in a
SVAR. Romer and Romer (2010) and Ramey (2011) also place their narrative fiscal measures as
first endogenous variable with a Choleski decomposition.
15The HFI approach addresses the problem of simultaneity which arises with low frequency
data since within a period monetary policy both affects financial variables and responds to their
movements (See Ramey (2016) for a survey).
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Figure 5: Impulse response function of a liquidity shock
Note: The figure show the responses of 10-year government bond yield (left panel) and CDS
spread (right panel) to one standard deviation shock to haircuts. The solid blue line plots the
posterior median and the red dash lines are the 10th and 90th percentiles with 50000 draws for
which the first 20000 are discarded as burn-in draws.
In particular, LCH Clearnet Ltd published indicative thresholds at a 450 basis
points spread at the 10-year maturity to AAA benchmark, or at a 500 basis points
at 5-year CDS spread as risks indicators.16 However, the clearing house also states
that these are key indicators to judge the credit risk of a security but do not trigger
automatic actions for increases in haircuts and margin calls.17 Furthermore, Bank
of Italy (2013) documents that changes in haircuts applied by LCH Clearnet partly
followed discretionary criteria and were unexpected.
In order to confirm that changes in haircut could not be anticipated, I perform
two statistical tests. First, I construct a variable hat for the changes in haircuts
16See LCH. Clearnet (2010): http://secure-area.lchclearnet.com/member_
notices/circulars/2010-10-05.asp and LCH.Clearnet Margining Approach (2011):
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/groups/pdf/mmcg/Item_1_LCH_Margining.pdf?
0fe79f1cef93461dc22566a4e165db44.
17See LCH Clearnet (2014) “Frequently asked questions on the sovereign risk framework”.
Furthermore, ICMA (2015, pag. 25) argues that “Although CCPs apply more rigorous risk
management practices than many market users, their methodologies are often proprietary and
therefore opaque, and it is not possible for members to scrutinize these methodologies, despite
their critical dependence on them”.
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on Irish bonds on the date of the announcement of their revision, instead of on
the date of the effective changes as measured by ht. I run a Granger causality
test of CDS spread and yield spread to 10-year German bonds on the announced
variations in haircut hat . If they help predict variations in h
a
t , market participants
could anticipate their modifications by looking at these indicators of sovereign risk.
Table 4 in the Appendix B.1 shows that the CDS spread and yield spread fail to
predict announced changes in haircuts, confirming that changes in haircuts did not
automatically follow variations in these indicators and were in part discretionary.
Second, I run the Hansen (2000) test to assess the presence of a threshold regressing
ht on CDSt.
18 Figure 14 in the Appendix B.1 displays the graph on the normalized
likelihood ratio sequence as a function of the threshold in CDS spread. The graph
provides evidence of a threshold at 562 basis points, substantially higher than the
500 basis points threshold published by LCH Clearnet Ltd, as a key indicator
of risk. These tests suggest that variations in haircuts were to a large extent
exogenous liquidity surprises.
As a robustness test, I estimate impulse response by local projections (Jorda`
(2005)), using the series of haircuts as narrative shock. This approach does not
require transforming the VAR model into a vector moving average model for the
impulse response function, using estimated parameters for horizon 0 to iterate
forward. Moving average representation of VAR can be non-fundamental with
small-scale VAR or in the presence of anticipated shocks, so the advantage of
using an observable narrative shock is that it allows to compute impulse responses
omitting a large amount of information that would be orthogonal to the shock
18I obtain similar results when I regress hat on CDSt. The yield spread to 10-year German
bonds was above 450 basis points for the whole period of the sample.
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included in the regression. The model is the following
ydt = δ
′Xt−1 + βshockt + ut (3)
where Xt−1 include a constant and the first four lags of the variables CDSt and
ydt; δ collects the coefficients; shockt corresponds to the series of haircut.
19 I use
the Newey-West corrections for standard errors because of the serial correlation in
the error terms induced by the successive leading of the dependent variable. Figure
6 shows that with local projections the funding liquidity shock has a substantial
effect on government bond yield. A one percent shock in the haircut increases the
government bond yield with the peak effect to 4.8 percent after 18 days. The im-
pact remains significant for 30 days, analogously to the impulse response estimated
with the BVAR.
Overall, these findings lend support to the presence of a negative liquidity spiral
on the Irish sovereign debt market during the crisis, which amplified the rise in the
yields. Since the high frequency of financial series is essential for the identification
of a funding liquidity shock, I do not consider its impact on macroeconomic vari-
ables in the empirical analysis.20 However, empirical literature provides evidence
that, during the crisis, the rise in government bond yields negatively affected firms’
capital expenditure through the bank lending channel (see Acharya, Eisert, Eufin-
ger, and Hirsch (2014) and Altavilla, Pagano, and Simonelli (2016)). In the next
section I feed the funding liquidity shock identified with the narrative approach
into a DSGE model featuring liquidity frictions, in order to study its impact on
19When I include a linear and quadratic time trend results remain almost unchanged.
20The mixed frequency VAR approach creates a bridge between high frequency financial vari-
ables and low frequency macroeonomic variables but cannot keep the daily frequency of financial
variables that I exploit for the identification strategy (see Foroni and Marcellino (2014)).
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macroeconomic variables.
Figure 6: Response of government bond yield to a liquidity shock
Note: The figure shows the impulse response of 10-year government bond yield to a one per-
cent liquidity shock. The dash lines represent 95 percent bands that are based on Newey-West
standard error.
4 The model
The model is an infinite horizon economy populated by a continuum of households
of measure one. The members of each household are either entrepreneurs or work-
ers. The model incorporates nominal rigidities, since prices and wages are set in
staggered contracts, and real rigidities with capital adjustment cost along the lines
of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007).21
Households allocate saving across three riskless financial assets characterized by
different degrees of liquidity: equity, long-term and short-term sovereign bonds.
Long-term bonds are subject to a liquidity shock which is the only shock perturb-
21Appendix C.1 through C.4 reports the equations for the production process, market-clearing
and equilibrium conditions.
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ing the economy. In response to this shock the government can implement an
unconventional policy that consists of increasing the supply of short-term bonds
that are more liquid than long-term bonds.
4.1 Households
Structure. Each household has a unit measure of members indexed j ∈ [0, 1]. At
the beginning of each period all members are identical and hold an equal share of
the household’s assets. They receive an idiosyncratic shock, iid across members
and across time, which determines their profession. With probability γ they are
entrepreneurs and with probability 1 − γ they are workers. By the law of large
number γ also represents the fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy. Each
entrepreneur j ∈ [0, γ) invests and each worker j ∈ [γ, 1] supplies labor; both types
return their earnings to the household and at the end of each period all members
share consumption goods and assets, but resources cannot be reallocated among
members within the period.
Preferences. The household’s objective is to maximize the utility function
Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
[
c1−σs
1− σ −
ξ
1 + η
∫ 1
γ
hs(j)
1+ηdj
]
(4)
where Et denotes the conditional expectation, β is the subjective discount factor,
σ measures the degree of relative risk aversion, ξ is a scaling parameter that can
be chosen to match a target value for the steady state level of hours and η is the
inverse of the Frisch elasticity of the labor supply. Utility depends positively upon
the sum of the consumption good bought by household members (ct =
∫ 1
0
ct(j)dj)
and negatively upon the workers’ labor supply ht.
21
Portfolio. Households hold physical capital kt with price qt that depreciates for
a fraction δ every period.They can sell claims on their capital to other households,
sIt , which represents the only liabilities of households, and purchase claims on
other households’ capital, sOt . Equity issued by the other households (s
O
t ) and the
unmortgaged capital stock (kt − sIt ) are assumed to yield the same returns, have
the same value and liquidity and depreciate at the same rate, so they are perfect
substitutes and can be summed together and defined as net equity
st = s
O
t + kt − sIt (5)
Households also own government debt with different maturities. Short-term
bonds bSt are one period securities purchased at time t at price q
S
t that pay an
unit return at time t + 1. The price of short-term bond is the inverse of the gross
nominal interest rate
qSt =
1
rt
(6)
Long-term bonds bLt are perpetuities with coupons which decay exponentially
as in Woodford (2001) with price qLt . A bond issued at date t pays λ
k−1 at date
t + k, where λ ∈ [0, 1] is the coupon decay factor that parametrizes the maturity
of long-term bonds, corresponding to (1− λβ)−1. If λ = 0 these securities are one
period zero coupon bonds and if λ = 1 they are consols.22 In the steady state the
returns on long-term and short-term bonds are linked by a non-arbitrage condition.
Following Chen, Curdia, and Ferrero (2012), the gross yield to maturity at time t
22An alternative interpretation of the long-term debt is that λ is the fraction of the outstanding
bonds paying a constant coupon of 1 and (1− λ) is the fraction of bonds which mature at each
period and for which the government pays back the principal to the bond holder (Chatterjee and
Eyigungor (2012)).
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on long-term bond is defined as
ydt =
1
qLt
+ λ (7)
At the end of each period households receive the dividend per unit of capital own-
ership rKt , which is the sum of rental income of capital and profits of intermediate
good producers and capital good producers. Table 1 summarizes the household’s
balance sheet at the beginning of the period.
Table 1: Household’s balance sheet (financial assets)
Asset Liability
Capital stock: qtkt Equity issued: qts
I
t
Other’s equity: qtn
O
t
Long-term bonds: qLt b
L
t /pt
Short-term bonds: qSt b
S
t /pt Net worth: qtst + q
L
t b
L
t /pt + q
S
t b
S
t /pt
Resources allocation. When the asset market and goods market open house-
holds allocate their resources and trade assets to finance new investments. The
flow of fund constraint of household member j is as follows
ct(j) + q
I
t it(j) + q
L
t
bLt+1(j)
pt
+ qSt
bSt+1(j)
pt
+ qt[st+1(j)− it(j)]
=
[
1 + λqSt
] bLt
pt
+
bSt
pt
+ [rKt + (1− δ)qt]st +
wt(j)
pt
ht(j)− tt
(8)
where pt denotes the price level, q
I
t is the cost of one unit of new capital in terms
of consumption goods, differing from 1 because of capital adjustment cost, wt(j) is
the nominal wage for workers j. According to the left side of the budget constraint,
the household members allocate resources between purchase of non-storable con-
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sumption good, investment in new capital - if they are entrepreneurs - net purchase
of equity, long-term bonds and short-term bonds. They finance their activities on
the right side of the budget constraint with returns on financial assets (equity,
long-term bonds and short-term bonds) and wages - if they are workers - net of
taxes.
A key assumption of the model is the presence of the following funding con-
straints that limit the financing of new investments by entrepreneurs and determine
the different degree of liquidity of the assets
st+1(j) ≥ (1− θ)it(j) + (1− δ)st (9)
bLt+1(j) ≥ (1− φt)bLt (10)
bSt+1(j) ≥ 0 (11)
Inequality 9 means that the entrepreneur can issue claims on the future output
of investment but only for a fraction θ ∈ [0, 1]. This borrowing constraint implies
that investment is partially funded internally and entrepreneurs have to retain
1− θ as their own equity. In addition, equity is assumed to be completely illiquid
since entrepreneurs cannot sell it to obtain more resources to invest. Hence, the
entrepreneurs’ equity holding at the start of the period t+1 must be at least the
sum of (1−θ)it and depreciated equity (1−δ)st, where λ is the inverse depreciation
rate.23
23Nezafat and Slavik (2017) model a financial shock as a tightening in the credit conditions and
a drop in θ and assume that equity/capital is completely liquid. In our set-up the assumption
that equity is illiquid means that entrepreneurs cannot issue equity on the unmortgaged capital
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The entrepreneur can acquire additional resources by disposing of a fraction
φt ∈ [0, 1] of long-term bonds, so a resaleability constraint is imposed to keep the
residual (1− φt) of bonds in his portfolio (inequality 10). (1− φt) is equivalent to
the haircut in a repo transaction since it determines the amount of liquidity that
the entrepreneur can obtain by pledging sovereign securities in secured borrowing.
In other words, the entrepreneur cannot borrow against the entire bond holding
because of the presence of the haircut.
Inequality 11 implies that short-term bonds are not subject to resaleability
constraint and are fully liquid, but entrepreneurs cannot borrow from the gov-
ernment.24 φt is the key parameter of the model characterizing the liquidity of
financial assets. We can think that it takes value 0 for equity, value 1 for short-
term bonds and an intermediate value for long-term bonds. The assumption on
the diverse resaleability of equity and bonds reflects the different liquidity of pri-
vately issued securities, which are scarcely used as collateral, and sovereign bonds,
which are largely pledged by European banks for repo transactions, and gives gov-
ernment bonds a special liquidity function. φt follows a stationary AR(1) process
and the dynamic of the model follows an unexpected negative shock to φt, which
is paramount to a rise in the repo haircut on sovereign bonds.25
At the end of the period, the assets of households are given by
st+1 =
∫
st+1(j) dj (12)
stock and cannot sell any of the remaining equity to others.
24Similarly, inequalities 9 and 10 ensure that receipts from trading equity and long-term bonds
are strictly positive, which prevents the entrepreneur from going short on these securities.
25The model is solved with the Newton-Raphson algorithm in order to take into account the
ZLB and non-linear perfect foresight.
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bSt+1 =
∫
bSt+1(j) dj (13)
bLt+1 =
∫
bLt+1(j) dj (14)
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt +
∫
it(j) dj (15)
Next, the specific functions of entrepreneurs and workers are taken into account.
4.1.1 Entrepreneurs
The entrepreneur j ∈ [0, γ) does not supply labor, so Ht(j) = 0 in equation 8 to
get his budget constraint. In order to acquire new capital he can either produce it
at price qIt or buy it in the market at price qt. For the rest of the model I assume
that qt > q
I
t in order to focus on the economy where the liquidity constraints
bind, thus limiting the ability of the entrepreneur to finance investments. In this
case, entrepreneurs will use all the available liquidity for new investment projects to
maximize the households’ utility. Accordingly, they minimize the equity holding by
issuing the maximum amount of claims on the investment return. The entrepreneur
also sells the maximum amount of bonds as allowed by constraints 10 and 11,
because their expected returns are lower than those on new investment. As a
result, in equilibrium the liquidity constraints all bind and the entrepreneur does
not consume goods within the period:
st+1(j) = (1− θ)it(j) + (1− δ)st (16)
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bLt+1(j) = (1− φ)bLt (17)
bSt+1(j) = 0 (18)
ct(j) = 0 (19)
Given the solutions for entrepreneurs, st+1(j), b
L
t+1(j), b
S
t+1(j), ct for j ∈ [0, γ), equa-
tions 16, 17, 18 and 19 can be plugged into equation 8 to derive the function of
investment for entrepreneurs
it(j) =
rKt st + [1 + λφtq
L
t ]
bLt
pt
+ qSt
bSt
pt
− tt
qIt − θqt
(20)
Aggregating by entrepreneurs total investment is
it =
∫ γ
0
it(j) dj = γ
rKt st + [1 + λφtq
L
t ]
bLt
pt
+ qSt
bSt
pt
− tt
qIt − θqt
(21)
Investment is a function of the the maximum liquidity available for the entrepreneurs
(the numerator) and the downpayment, which is the difference between the price of
one unit of investment goods qIt and the value of equity issued by the entrepreneur
θqt (the denominator).
4.1.2 Workers
Workers j ∈ [γ, 1] do not invest, so it(j) = 0. They supply labor as demanded by
firms at a fixed wage; the union who representing each type of worker sets wages
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on a staggered basis. To determine the asset and consumption choices of workers,
I first derive the household’s decision for st+1, b
L
t+1, b
S
t+1 and ct, taking wt and ht
as given. Knowing the solution for entrepreneurs, st+1(j), b
L
t+1(j), b
S
t+1(j) and ct(j)
can be determined for workers, given the aggregate consumption and asset holding.
4.1.3 The problem of households
To solve the model for the household, I aggregate the workers’ and entrepreneurs’
budget constraint
ct(j) + q
I
t it(j) + q
L
t
bLt+1(j)
pt
+ qSt
bSt+1(j)
pt
+ qt[st+1(j)− it(j)]
=
[
1 + λqSt
] bLt
pt
+
bSt
pt
+ [rKt + (1− δ)qt]st +
∫ 1
γ
wt(j)
pt
ht(j)− tt
(22)
Households maximize the utility function (5) by choosing ct, st+1, b
L
t+1 and b
S
t+1
subject to the aggregate budget constraint and the investment constraint. The first
order conditions for equity, long-term bonds and short-term bonds are respectively
U ′c,t = βEt
{
U ′c,t+1
[
rKt+1 + (1− δ)qt+1
qt
+
γ(qt+1 − qIt+1)
qIt+1 − θqt+1
rKt+1
qt
]}
(23)
U ′c,t = βEt
{
1
pit+1
U ′c,t+1
[
1 + λqLt+1
qLt
+
γ(qt+1 − qIt+1)
qIt+1 − θqt+1
1 + λφt+1q
L
t+1
qLt
]}
(24)
U ′c,t = βEt
{
1
pit+1
U ′c,t+1
[
rt +
γ(qt+1 − qIt+1)
qIt+1 − θqt+1
rt
]}
(25)
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where pit is the inflation rate defined as pit =
pt+1
pt
. The choice of sacrificing one unit
of consumption today to purchase a paper gives a payoff which is composed of two
parts. The first is the returns on the assets:
rKt+1+λqt+1
qt
for equity,
1+λqLt+1
qLt
for long-
term bonds and rt for short-term bonds. The second part is a premium, deriving
from the fact that papers in the entrepreneurs’ portfolio relax their investment
constraint. This premium is a function of the leverage 1
qIt−θqt
, the gap between
qt and q
I
t , which represents the marginal value of relaxing the constraint, and
the liquid returns of each asset. The bond holding eases the financing constraints
more than the equity holding, which makes bonds more valuable for entrepreneurs.
Further, long-term bonds pay a liquidity premium relative to short-term bonds,
which depends on φt+1. The spread between long-term and short-term bond is the
difference between the returns of the two assets:
sprt =
1 + λqLt+1
qLt
− rt (26)
4.2 The Government
The government conducts conventional fiscal and monetary policy, and unconven-
tional monetary policy. The intertemporal budget constraint is
qLt
bLt+1
pt
+ qSt
bSt+1
pt
+ tt = (1 + λq
L
t )
bLt
pt
+
bSt
pt
(27)
The debt repayment is financed by the issue of new debt and net taxes tt, which
can be interpreted as primary balance. A solvency condition links taxes with
the outstanding beginning-of-period long-term debt in deviations from the steady
state to satisfy the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. The government
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adjusts fiscal policy when the debt level goes up as in Chen, Curdia, and Ferrero
(2012) and Davig and Leeper (2006)
tt − t = ψT
(
bLt
pt
− b
L
p
)
(28)
where ψT > 0 measures the elasticity of fiscal policy to variations in the size of the
debt. Short-term debt does not enter into the solvency condition to avoid that the
unconventional policy is counteracted by higher taxes.26 However, quantitatively
results do not change by including the short-term debt since the adjustment of
taxes to debt is gradual (ψT is small) and at the steady state short-term bond is
in zero net supply. The government sets the nominal interest rate following the
feedback rule constrained by the zero lower bound condition
rt = max
{
rpiψpit
(
yt
y
)ψy
, 1
}
(29)
where ψpi > 1 and ψy > 0. Unconventional policy consists of purchasing illiquid
long-term bonds by issuing liquid short-term bonds when the liquidity of long-term
bonds dries up. The supply of one-period bond is proportional to the deviation of
liquidity from its the steady state
bSt+1
pt
= ψB (φt − φ) (30)
where ψB < 0. This unconventional policy differs from the liquidity facilities
studied in Ashcraft, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2010), where the monetary authority
following a tightening in margin requirements of securities lends against these
26Cui (2016) analyzes the trade-off of issuing more liquid public debt financed via distortionary
taxes.
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securities at a lower haircut to alleviate the funding problems, similarly to the
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). Here the government does not
directly relax the funding constraint but intervenes in the open market by providing
a more liquid asset and changing the portfolio composition of entrepreneurs. In
Chen, Curdia, and Ferrero (2012) the government also modifies the composition of
outstanding liabilities, but increasing exogenously the supply of long-term bonds.
5 Numerical simulation
5.1 Parametrization
Table 2 reports the parameter values of the model calibrated at quarterly fre-
quency. There are two sets of parameters. One is specific to the Irish economy
for financial frictions (φ, θ), the maturity of public debt (λ) and the coefficient
for unconventional policy (ψB). The other is standard in the literature of DSGE
models. I calibrate the dynamics of φt using the liquidity shock identified via the
narrative approach in Section 3.
The key parameter characterizing the financial frictions is the liquidity con-
straint φ. The steady state value of liquidity is 0.85, corresponding to one minus
the haircut applied in the repo market by LCH Clearnet on 10-year Irish bonds
before the crisis, which was 15%. The size of the liquidity shock is 0.40, equivalent
to the rise in the haircut between the last quarter of 2010 and the first quarter of
2011, when the haircut jumped from 15% to 55% (see Figure 4). The persistence
of the shock ρφ is 0.985, so that the ZLB binds for 20 quarters. This value also
corresponds to the autoregressive coefficient of the liquidity shock φt estimated in
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Table 2: Parametrization
Definition Parameter Value
Preferences
Household discount factor β 0.993
Relative risk aversion σ 1.000
Inverse Frish elasticity η 1.000
Production and investment
Capital share of output α 0.340
Investment adjustment cost Γ′′(1) 0.750
Probability of investment opportunity γ 0.009
Depreciation rate δ 0.027
Nominal frictions
Price and wage calvo probability ζpi = ζw 0.750
Price and wage steady-state markup δpi = δw 0.100
Financial frictions
Borrowing constraint θ 0.300
Liquidity constraint φ 0.850
Size of liquidity shock ∆φ -0.400
Shock persistence ρφ 0.990
Steady-state of liquidity share ls 0.430
Bond maturity parameter λ 0.973
Policy rules
Taylor rule inflation response ψpi 1.500
Taylor rule output response ψy 0.125
Tax rule response ψT 0.100
Baseline policy intervention ψB -.2598
Note: The table shows the parameter values of the model.
an AR(1) process.
The other parameter characterizing the financial frictions θ describes the frac-
tion of investment financed externally. Since entrepreneurs represent broadly the
banking system in channeling resources to the production sector of the economy,
I consider θ as the ratio of Irish banks’ external finance over total assets, using
aggregate banks’ balance sheet data from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. I
compute the average of this ratio for the period between 2000 and 2011, which is
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0.3. The liquidity share in this economy is defined as:
lst =
φqLt b
L
t+1
φqLt b
L
t+1 + qtptkt+1
(31)
The nominator is the liquid part of public debt computed as the total of Irish
government gross liabilities times the liquidity parameter. The denominator is
equal to the value of the total productive capital. Data are taken from the OECD
Economic Outlook. The average of this ratio during the period between 2000 and
2011 is 0.43, which is taken as the steady state value of the liquidity share.
The parameter λ pins down the duration of long-term bonds given by (1−λβ)−1
I set λ = 0.973 to match the average maturity of the Irish debt, which is 6.9 years
(Eurostat (2013)). The calibration of the liquidity policy response parameter (ψB)
is based on the actual ECB intervention on the Irish bond secondary market with
the Expanded Asset Purchase Programme (APP), which is around 1% of Irish
GDP.27
There are two important differences with respect to Del Negro, Eggertsson, Fer-
rero, and Kiyotaki (2017). In their calibration the size of the liquidity shock, based
on the convenience yield of US Treasuries, is smaller (-0.218) and the coefficient of
unconventional policy of the Federal Reserve in exchanging government liquidity
for private financial assets is larger (-4.801), because its intervention was about
10% of GDP. As counterfactual I consider a scenario in which the unconventional
policy is more aggressive and the size of intervention is 10% of GDP.
27The share of national government bonds purchased by the ECB is based on its capital key
rule. The monthly volume of Irish government bonds is around e0.7 bn. The calibrated value
of the liquidity policy response parameter ψB does not consider other ECB’s interventions such
as the Security Market Programme and 3-year LTROs which swapped illiquid Irish bonds with
public liquidity.
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Other parameters are standard in the literature: the discount factor β = 0.99,
the inverse Frish elasticity of labor supply η = 1, the relative risk aversion parame-
ter σ = 1, the capital share α = 0.34, the depreciation rate δ = 0.027, Γ′′(1) = 0.75
and the arrival rate of investment opportunity in each quarter γ = 0.009. For real
and nominal rigidities, the degree of monopolistic competition in labor and prod-
uct markets is calibrated symmetrically assuming a steady state markup of 10%
(δp = δw = 0.1). The average duration of price and wage contracts is 4 quarters
(ζp = ζw = 0.75). Concerning the monetary policy rule, the Taylor rule coefficient
for inflation (ψpi) and output gap (ψy) are 1.5 and 0.125, respectively. The govern-
ment finances most of the intervention through emission of new short-term debt
and transfers slowly adjust to the government net wealth position (ψT = 0.1).
5.2 Results
5.2.1 The impact of the liquidity shock
I first analyze the economy in which the government does not respond to the
calibrated liquidity shock φt. As Figure 7 shows, the the price of long-term bond
declines (1.1%) and yield to maturity (0.06%) increases in annualized percentage
rates. Furthermore, the contraction in the liquidity of long-term bond leads to a
“flight-to-liquidity” towards the more liquid short-term bond, as indicated by the
rise in the spread between long-term and short-term bonds (3.3%).
Figure 8 shows the response of output, inflation, consumption and investment
to the liquidity shock. Inflation is expressed in annualized percentage points,
while the level of output, consumption and investment correspond to percentage
deviations from the trend. The model suggests that the impact of the liquidity
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shock on macroeconomic variables is large and persistent. Output and inflation
fall by -12% and -11.5%.
Figure 7: Response of price and yield to maturity of long term bonds and the
spread between long-term and short-term bond to the liquidity shock
Note: The figure shows the response of price and yield to maturity of long-term bonds to the
calibrated liquidity shock expressed in annualized percentage points and the response of the
spread between long-term and short-term bond in percentage points.
Breaking down the drop in output to consumption and investment, the last
row of Figure 8 shows that they reduce respectively by 3% and 40%. The contrac-
tion of liquidity impacts directly on investment by tightening the entrepreneurs’
funding constraint and shrinking the liquidity they can obtain. The large drop in
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investment is due to the magnitude of the liquidity shock. Calibrating the size
of the liquidity shock with the same value as Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and
Kiyotaki (2017), investment falls to -14% and output and consumption decrease
to -5% and -1.5%, respectively.
Figure 8: Response of output, inflation, consumption and investment to the liq-
uidity shock
Note: The figure shows the response of output, inflation, consumption and investment to the
calibrated liquidity shock. Output, consumption and inflation are expressed in the log-deviation
from steady state in percentage points. Inflation is expressed in annualized percentage points.
The presence of nominal rigidities combined with the zero lower bound is a
key element for the fall in consumption, because expected deflation leads to higher
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real interest rates; when the real interest rate declines the response of consumption
becomes positive. With flexible prices the contraction in economic activity would
lead to a negative real interest rate and a boost in consumption, as observed in
Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) and Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Kiyotaki
(2017).
The effect of a funding liquidity crisis generated with a drop in φt is analogous
to a tightening of margin requirements of leveraged investors in Gaˆrleanu and
Pedersen (2011) and Ashcraft, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2010), which increases
the shadow cost of capital, raising the required returns of assets and lowering
investment and output. In the model the liquidity shock has a smaller impact on
the value and yield of long term bonds than in the empirical analysis. In Kiyotaki
and Moore (2012) a negative liquidity shock on equity leads to an increase in equity
price. Shi (2015) explains that this result is due to the rise in the demand for assets,
including the liquid part of equity, which in their model is partly liquid. Del Negro,
Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2017) shows that embedding nominal frictions
and the ZLB allows equity price to drop following the tightening in the liquidity
constraint on equity, but less than what observed in the data.
Figure 9 shows the changes in the data of output, inflation, consumption and
investment for Ireland during the financial crisis. It reports the percentage devi-
ation of output, consumption and investment from a linear trend estimated from
2000Q1 to 2012Q3, using the Hodrick Prescott filter, normalized to zero in 2008Q3.
Consumption and investment are expressed in real terms and output is the sum of
these two components. Inflation is the annualized percentage change in the GDP
deflator in deviation from the 2% target of the ECB.
The model matches some properties of the data. Output contracts by -14%
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Figure 9: Evolution of output, inflation, consumption and investment
Note: The figure shows the evolution ot output, inflation, consumption and investment in the
data. Output, consumption and investment are in percentage deviations from a linear trend
estimated with the Hodrick Prescott filter from 2000Q1 to 2012Q3 and are normalized to zero
in 2008Q3. Consumption is the private final consumption expenditure divided by the deflator of
private final consumption expenditure. Investment is the gross capital formation divided by the
deflator of gross capital formation. Output is the sum of real consumption and real investment.
Inflation is the annualized quarterly inflation rate of the GDP deflator. Data come from the
OECD Economic Outlook N.101.
similarly to the model. Investment reduces much more than consumption, re-
spectively -7% and -38%. Thus, the model overpredicts the fall in investment
and underpredicts the fall in consumption, which is deeper and more persistent,
but these differences are not far from what happened in Ireland during the crisis.
Finally, in the data the drop in inflation is also very large (-20%).
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5.2.2 The effects of the policy intervention
I consider now the case in which the government reacts to the drop in φt by issuing
more short-term bonds, which are not subject to the liquidity constraint, under
two scenarios: the baseline in which the policy intervention is calibrated for the
APP in the Irish bond market and the counterfactual with a stronger intervention.
Figure 10: The effect of the unconventional policy on price and yield to maturity
of long-term bonds
Note: This figure shows the difference between responses of investment (solid blue) and con-
sumption (dashed red) to the calibrated liquidity shock with and without the policy intervention
under the baseline scenario (left panel) and the counterfactual (right panel).
Figure 10 shows the gain in output and inflation for the two cases. In the
first scenario the fall in output and inflation is reduced by only 0.04% and 0.03%,
respectively (left panel). When we consider the counterfactual the unconventional
policy leads to a more substantial gain for the economy: the decline in output and
inflation is diminished by 0.38% and 0.25%.
Breaking down the gain in output by investment and consumption for the two
scenarios, Figure 11 shows that almost all the gain of the unconventional policy
comes from investment, which decline 0.2% less in the baseline and 1.8% less in the
counterfactual as a result of the unconventional policy. By contrast, consumption
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Figure 11: The effect of the unconventional policy on investment and consumption
Note: This figure shows the difference between responses of investment (solid blue) and con-
sumption (dashed red) with and without the policy intervention under the baseline scenario (left
panel) and the counterfactual (right panel).
is not affected by the policy in both cases.
The benefits of the government’s intervention derive from the modifications of
the investors’ portfolio which become more liquid and allow investors to circumvent
the liquidity constraint on long-term bonds with short-term bonds. However, the
gains are delayed since the portfolio of investors is predetermined in the first period.
The model suggests that this unconventional policy is successful in alleviating
partly the contractionary effect of the liquidity shock but requires a strong policy
intervention to produce quantitatively important results.
6 Conclusions
This paper has explored the liquidity channel of the Eurozone sovereign debt crises.
It has shown that government securities play a key role as collateral in the secured
interbank market, which is a primary source of funding for banks to meet their
liquidity needs. Nevertheless, during the crisis repo haircuts on peripheral govern-
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ment bonds substantially increased following the rise in their sovereign risk.
I identify a funding liquidity shock with the narrative approach by collecting
information on variations in haircut set by LCH Clearnet, the largest European
clearing house and I assess empirically the impact of a this shock on the Irish
sovereign debt market with impulse response functions of BVAR and local pro-
jection models. Results suggest that the funding liquidity shock increases the
government bond yield and CDS spread significantly, suggesting the presence of a
negative liquidity spiral in the Irish government debt market.
I feed the funding liquidity shock into a DSGE model with liquidity frictions
on long-term bond to simulate the impact of a rise in haircuts on macroeconomic
and financial variables. The model predicts a fall in the value of illiquid long-term
bond, a rise in its yield to maturity and a flight-to-liquidity from illiquid long-term
bond to liquid short-term bond. Furthermore, the model exhibits a substantial fall
in output, investments, consumptions and deflation. The contractionary effects of
the liquidity shock can be alleviated by an unconventional policy consisting of
issuing more short-term bonds to provide investors with a more liquid asset in
order to relax their funding constraint, but requires a strong intervention.
Several other macroeconomic and financial shocks played an important role
in the Eurozone crisis, including the losses in the banking system, the debt-
deleveraging process of households and the austerity measures of the public sector,
which contributed to the contraction of economic activity. However, the liquidity
channel magnified the tension in the sovereign debt markets and reinforced the
transmission to the real economy.
The theoretical model can be extended in several dimensions. One is to in-
troduce the sovereign risk, which is absent in this model that focuses on a pure
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liquidity channel. Following the literature on fiscal limit,28 when the level of the
debt approaches a stochastic threshold, the probability of default increases reduc-
ing the sovereign bond liquidity. This set up would allow to analyze the joint
interaction between sovereign risk and liquidity. I leave this extension for further
research.
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A Data Appendix
A.1 Definitions for repurchase agreements (repos)
A repo transaction is an agreement between two parties on the sale and subsequent
repurchase of securities at an agreed price. It is equivalent to a secured loan, with
the main difference that legal title of securities passes from the cash borrower to
the cash lender, who may re-use them as collateral in other repo transactions. In
order to protect the lender from the risk of a reduction in the value of collateral,
repos involve overcollateralization and the difference between the value of the loan
and the value of collateral is the haircut or initial margin. The haircut takes
account of the unexpected loss that the lender may face due to the difficulty of
selling the collateral security in response to a default by the borrower. Accordingly,
it provides a measure of market liquidity of collateral from the standpoint of the
lender and a measure of funding liquidity from the standpoint of the borrower
since this determines the amount of cash that can be raised given the value of the
collateral.
Figure 12 shows an example of a bilateral repo. At time t, the cash borrower
(securities dealer, commercial bank, hedge fund) posts e100 securities as collateral
and receives a e90 loan from the cash lender (commercial bank, investment fund,
money market fund) with a haircut of 10%. At time t+k, the borrower returns the
cash with an interest of 1.1% (the repo rate) and receives back the collateral. If
repo is used to finance the purchase of a security, the haircut is equivalent to the
inverse of the leverage. In order to hold e100 securities the investor can borrow
up to e90 from the repo lender and must come up with e10 of its own capital, so
the maximum leverage is 10. A rise in the haircut by 10 percentage points reduces
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Figure 12: Bilateral repo contract
the borrower’s funding to e80 and its leverage to 5.
According to the involvement of intermediaries between the lender and the bor-
rower, repos can be distinguished as two types. In bilateral repos, the lender and
the borrower transact directly with each other, selecting the collateral, initiating
the transfer of cash and securities, and conducting collateral valuation. In tri-party
repos, a third party intermediates the transaction, providing operational services
to the parties, in particular the selection and valuation of collateral securities, but
does not participate in the risk of transaction.
The determinants of haircuts vary according to the repo structure. In repos
that are not cleared by a Central Clearing Counterparty (CCP), the haircut reflects
mainly the creditworthiness of the borrower. Instead in repos involving a CCP
which bears the counterparty credit risk, haircuts are settled on the basis of the
CCP’s internal rules and depend on the market risk of collateral.
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A.2 Data on repos
Because of the lack of comprehensive information on the European repo market,
I use different sources. First, Bankscope, which provide banks’ balance sheet
data at annual frequency showing the amount of repos and reverse repos held by
credit intermediaries. It allows to compare different funding instruments, but lacks
important breakdowns (such as counterparty, maturity and currency) preventing
a more granular analysis and does not distinguish between repos in the interbank
market from ECB monetary policy operations.
The table below shows the funding structure of the largest banks for which
Bankscope eport information on repos. I consider 2010 in order to avoid the 3-
year LTROs implemented in 2011 and 2012.
Second, the European Repo Market Survey published semi-annually by the In-
ternational Capital Market Association (ICMA) since 2001, which asks a sample of
67 banks in Europe for the value of their repo contracts that were still outstanding
at close of a certain business date excluding repos transacted with central banks as
part of official monetary policy operations. From the data of the European Repo
Market Survey I subtracted reverse repos in order to focus the analysis on the
liability side of banks’ balance sheets. The survey reports information on the size
and composition of the European repo market, including the type of repo traded,
the rates, the collateral, the cash currency and the maturity. Third, the Euro
Money Market Survey, an yearly survey published by the ECB since 2002 covering
101 banks, which breaks down the repo market to three segments: CCP-based,
over-the-counter bilateral, and triparty.
Finally, I collected data on haircuts to 10-year government bonds applied by
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Table 3: Funding structure of European commercial banks in percentage of total
liabilities (2010)
Bank Deposits Interbank LT debt Repos
BNP Paribas 26.62 7.07 6.19 10.48
Barclays Bank Plc 23.41 5.89 9.89 13.26
Banco Santander 45.04 4.69 16.92 9.60
Socie´te´ Generale 24.47 7.62 8.74 9.58
UBS AG 24.13 2.13 10.04 12.52
UniCredit SpA 42.99 10.83 16.96 3.39
Credit Agricole Corporate 14.43 10.63 0.70 5.61
Intesa Sanpaolo 30.84 10.32 27.99 1.99
Banco Bilbao 43.79 6.01 14.16 8.89
Commerzbank AG 34.32 12.01 13.72 7.13
Danske Bank 23.22 5.19 27.66 7.87
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken 35.5 7.42 14.01 2.14
Bankia SA 36.78 3.43 29.6 11.56
Svenska Handelsbanken 29.21 8.06 30.27 0.49
Fortis Bank 41.18 7.68 5.50 4.30
Abbey National Treasury Services Plc 52.99 13.42 13.85 2.79
KBC 50.76 7.35 10.58 8.53
Banca Monte dei Paschi 32.35 9.41 24.56 9.86
Note: The table displays the structure of European commercial banks in percentage of total
liabilities for 2010. Legend: Deposits = costumer deposits; Interbank = interbank deposits; LT
debt = long-term debt; Repos = repurchase agreements.
Source: Bankscope. S
the LCH Clearnet, which is the largest European clearing house, and I use the
Repo Clear Margin Rate Circulars to identify a funding liquidity shock with the
narrative approach (see Appendix B.1).
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B Econometric model
B.1 Identification of liquidity shock and statistical tests
Figure 13: Example of Repo Clear Margin Rate Circular
Table 4: Granger causality tests
Hypothesis test Result F statistics Critical value
Do CDS spreads Granger-cause variations in haircut ? No 2.25 3.88
Do yield spreads Granger-cause variations in haircut ? No 0.40 3.88
Note: The number of lags is selected using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) considering
a maximum of 10 lags. Tests are performed at the significance level of 0.05. If the F-statistics
is lower than the critical value, we accept the null hypothesis that variable X does not Granger-
causes variable Y.
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Figure 14: Confidence interval construction for threshold
Note: The threshold test statistics is plotted for the regression ht = α0 + α1CDSt The figure
displays a graph of the normalized likelihood sequences as a function of the threshold (CDSt).
The dotted line plots the 95% critical value.
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Figure 15: Repo haircut and 500 bp threshold of CDS spread
Note: The blue line plots the haircuts on 10-year Irish government bonds applied the LCH
Clearnet. The dash red vertical lines represent the episodes when the CDS spread of Irish
government bonds breached the 500 basis point threshold.
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B.2 Bayesian estimation
Given N different variables in a vector yt = (y1t, ..., yNt)
′, consider the following
VAR:
yt = A1yt−1 + ...+ Apyt−p + ut
where t = 1,...,T and ut ∼ (0,Σu). Each equation has M = Np + 1 regressors.
By collecting the coefficient matrices in the N x M matrix A = [Ac, A1, ..., Ap] and
defining xt = (1, y
′
t−1, ..., y
′
t−p)
′ as a vector containing an intercept and p lags of yt,
the VAR can be written as
Y = XΦ + A
where Y = [y1, ..., yT ]
′, X = [x1, ..., xT ]′ and A = [A1, ..., AT ]′ are matrices of
dimension T x N, T x M and T x N respectively. Defining the following OLS
estimations Aˆ = (X ′X)−1X ′Y , aˆ = vec(Aˆ), Sˆ = (Y −XAˆ)′(Y −XAˆ), and Σˆu = ,
we consider the non-infornative version of the natural conjugate prior:
α|Σ, y ∼ N(α∗, V ∗)
Σ−1|y ∼ W (S−1, T −K)
where V ∗ = Σu ⊗ (X ′X)−1 and a∗ = aˆ + Q. Q is the Choleski factor of V ∗, i.e.
V ∗ = QQ′.
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C Additional Model Details and Optimality Con-
ditions
C.1 Final and Intermediate Good Firms
Competitive final good producers combine differentiated intermediate goods Yit,
for i ∈ [0, 1] into a single homogeneous final good Yt, using a constant return to
scale technology.
yt =
[∫ 1
0
y
1
1+δpi
it di
]1+δpi
(C.1)
where δpi > 0. They take input prices pit and output prices pt as given and choose
yit to maximize profits
ptyt −
∫ 1
0
pit yit di,
The solution to the profit maximization gives their demand for the generic ith
intermediate good
yit =
[
pit
pt
]− 1+δpi
δpi
yt (C.2)
The zero profit condition for competitive final-goods producers implies that the
aggregate price level is
pt =
[∫ 1
0
p
− 1
δpi
it di
]−δpi
(C.3)
Monopolistically competitive intermediate goods producers hire labor services
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from households and rent capital from entrepreneurs to produce the intermediate
goods choosing (i) the optimal amount of inputs, (ii) optimal price setting in case
can adjust its price.
(i) The intermediate good producer i chooses the optimal amount of inputs to
minimize the costs
rKt kit + wthit
subject to the production technology
yit = at k
α
it h
1−α
it − Ω (C.4)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the share of capital, at is an aggregate productivity shock and
Ω is fixed cost of production, kit denotes the capital services and hit the quantity
of labor hired by the ith intermediate-good producer. Defining Wt =
wt
pt
the real
wage, the first order condition implies that capital-labor ratio is independent of
firm-specific variables
kit
hit
=
kt
ht
=
α
1− α
Wt
rKt
(C.5)
The Lagrange multiplier on the constraint is the real marginal cost which is also
independent of firm-specific variables
mcit = mct =
1
at
(
rKt
α
)α(
Wt
1− α
)1−α
(C.6)
(ii) Intermediate good producers set prices pit subject to Calvo (1983) scheme
frictions. With probability 1− ζp, the firm can reset its price and with probability
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ζp cannot. By the law of large numbers, the probability of changing the price
corresponds to the fraction of firms that rest the price, so each period a randomly
selected fraction of firms 1−ζp choose the price p˜it to maximize the present discount
value of profit
Et
∞∑
s=t
(βζp)
s−tc−σs
[
p˜it
ps
−mcs
]
ys(i) = 0
subject to (C.2). The first order condition is
Et
∞∑
s=t
(βζp)
s−tc−σs
[
p˜it
ps
− (1 + δpi)mcs
]
ys(i) = 0
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which all firms choose the same price
p˜it = p˜t. Let P˜t = p˜t/pt the optimal relative price. The first order condition for
optimal price settings becomes
Et
∞∑
s=t
(βζp)
s−tc−σs
[
p˜it
pis
− (1 + δpi)mcs
](
P˜t
pit,s
)− 1+δpi
δpi
ys = 0 (C.7)
By the law of large numbers, the probability of changing the price coincides with
the fraction of firms who change the price in equilibrium. From the zero profit
condition (C.3) inflation depends on the optimal reset price according to
1 = (1− ζp)p˜−
1
δpi
t + ζp
(
1
pit
)
(C.8)
Plugging (C.8) into (C.7) the price setting rule becomes
1− ζpipi 1δpit
1− ζpi
−δpi = xp1t
xp2t
(C.9)
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where xp1t and x
p
2t are expected present value of real marginal cost and real marginal
revenue as
xp1t = c
−σ
t ytmct + βζpEt
(
pi
1+ζpi
ζpi
t+1 x
p
1t
)
(C.10)
xp2t =
1
1 + ζpi
c−σt yt + βζpEt
(
pi
1
ζpi
t+1 x
p
2t
)
(C.11)
The evolution of the real wage is given by
wt
wt−1
=
piwt
pit
(C.12)
where piwt =
wt
wt+1
is defined as the wage inflation. Since the ratio of capital-output
is independent of firm-specific factors, the aggregate production function is
atk
α
t h
1−α
t =
∫ 1
0
yit di =
∞∑
s=0
ζp(1− ζp)t−s
(
P˜t−s
pit−s,t
)− 1+δpi
δpi
yt (C.13)
where kt =
∫ 1
0
kit di and ht =
∫ 1
0
hit di. The effect of price dispersion is
∆t =
∞∑
s=0
ζp(1− ζp)t−s
(
P˜t−s
pit−s,t
)− 1+δpi
δpi
(C.14)
Using (C.8), ∆t can be expressed recursively
∆t = ζp∆t−1pi
1+δpi
δpi
t + (1− ζp)
1− ζpipi 1δpit
1− ζpi
1+δpi (C.15)
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The aggregate production function becomes
atk
α
t h
1−α
t − Ω = ∆tyt (C.16)
C.2 Labor market
The structure of the labor market is symmetric to that of the good market. Com-
petitive labor agencies aggregate differentiated j labor inputs into a homogeneous
single labor service ht according to the technology
ht =
[(
1
1− γ
) δw
1+δw
∫ 1
γ
ht(j)
1
1+δw
]1+δw
(C.17)
where δw > 0. They choose hjt to maximize their profits
wtht −
∫ 1
γ
wjthjtdj
subject to C.17 and taking wages specific wjt as given. The first order condition
yields the demand for the jth labor inputs
ht(j) =
1
1− γ
[
wt(j)
wt
]− 1+δw
δw
ht (C.18)
The aggregate wage index wt comes from the zero profit condition for labor agencies
wt =
[
1
1− γ
∫ 1
γ
w
− 1
δw
jt dj
]−δw
(C.19)
Labor unions represent all types of workers and set the wage rate wjt for the specific
labor input j subject to the Calvo scheme frictions on a staggered basis, taking
as given the demand for their specific labor input. Each period, labor agencies
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are able to reset the wage with probability 1 − ζw and with probability ζw they
cannot and the wage remains fixed. By the law of large number, the probability
of changing the wage corresponds to the fraction of workers whose wages change.
Households supply whatever labor is demanded at that wage. If labor agencies
can modify the wage, they will choose the wage w˜t to maximize
Et
∞∑
s=t
(βζp)
s−t
[
c1−σs
1− σ −
ξ
1 + η
∫ 1
γ
hs(j)
1+ν dj
]
(C.20)
subject to (22) and (C.18). Focusing on a symmetric equilibrium in which all
agencies choose the same wage, the first order condition for this problem is
Et
∞∑
s=t
(βζp)
s−tc−σs
 W˜tpit,s − (1 + δw)
ω
[
( W˜t
pit,sWs
)−
1+δw
δw Hs
]η
c−σs

(
W˜t
pit,sWs
)
hs(j) = 0
(C.21)
from (C.19) the law of motion of real wage is
W
1
δw
t = (1− ζw)w˜
− 1
δw
t + ζw
(
Wt−1
pit
)− 1
δw
(C.22)
Using (C.22), (C.21) can be written
1− ζpipi 1δpiwt
1− ζpi
−δpi+(1+piw)η = xw1t
xw2t
(C.23)
where xw1t and x
w
2t are the expected present value of marginal disutility of work and
real marginal wage revenue as
xw1t =
ω
(1− γ)ηh
1+η
t + βζwEt
(
pi
(1+δw)(1+η)
δw
wt+1 x
w
1t+1
)
(C.24)
63
xw2t =
1
1 + δw
c−σt Wtht + βζwEt
(
pi
1
δw
wt+1x
w
2t+1
)
(C.25)
C.3 Capital-good producers
The creation of new capital is delegated to competitive capital-good producers who
transform consumption goods into investment goods. They choose the amount of
investment goods to maximize the profits taking the price of investment goods qIt
as given
dIt =
{
qIt −
[
1 + Γ
(
it
i
)]}
it (C.26)
The price of investment goods differ from the price of consumption goods because
of the adjustment costs, which depends on the deviations of actual investment from
its steady-state value. Γ(.)it reflects the adjustment cost and Γ(.) is a measure of
technology illiquidity, capturing the difficulty to undo investment. We assume that
Γ(1) = Γ′(1) = 0 and Γ′′
(
it
i
)
> 0. The first order condition for this problem is
qIt = 1 + Γ
(
it
i
)
+ Γ′
(
it
i
)
it
i
(C.27)
C.4 Market-clearing and equilibrium
The market-clearing conditions for composite labor and capital use are
ht =
∫ 1
0
hitdi
and
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kt =
∫ 1
0
kitdi
The law of motion of capital is
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it (C.28)
We consider the following identity equation between capital and net equity
kt+1 = st+1 (C.29)
The resource constraint can be expressed as
yt = ct +
[
1 + Γ
(
it
i
)]
it (C.30)
Finally, considering the aggregate expression for dt and d
I
t the investment function
can be written as
it = γ
rKt st + [1 + λφtq
L
t ]
bLt
pt
+ qSt
bSt
pt
+ yt − wtht − rKt kt + qIt it − it[1 + Γ
(
it
i
)
]− tt
qIt − θqt
(C.31)
To solve the model, I define BLt+1 =
bLt+1
pt
and BSt+1 =
bSt+1
pt
as real long-term and
short-term bonds. There are 5 endogenous state variables: the aggregate capital
stock, the real long-term bond, the real short-term bond, and the real wage rate and
the effect of price dispersion from the previous period (kt, B
L
t , B
S
t ,Wt−1,∆t). The
recursive competitive equilibrium is defined as 9 endogenous quantities (it, ct, yt, kt+1,
st+1, B
S
t+1, B
L
t+1, ht, tt) and 16 prices (qt, q
L
t , q
S
t , q
I
t , r
K
t , rt,Wt, pit, piwt,mct, x
p
1t, x
p
2t,
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xw1t, x
w
2t,∆t, ydt) as a function of state variables (kt, B
S
t , B
L
t ,Wt−1,∆t−1, At, φt),
which satisfies the 25 equilibrium conditions ( 6, 7 21, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29,
30, C.5, C.6, C.9, C.10, C.11 C.12, C.15, C.16, C.23, C.24, C.25, C.27, C.28, C.29,
C.30, ). Once all market clearing conditions and the government budget constraint
are satisfied, the household budget constraint (22) is satisfied by Walras’ Law.
C.5 Steady state
In the steady state Euler conditions are respectively
β−1 =
rK + (1− δ)q
q
+
γ(q − 1)r
q(1− θq) (C.32)
β−1 =
1 + λqL
qL
+
γ(q − 1)
q(1− θq)
1 + λφqL
qL
(C.33)
β−1 =
1
qS
+
γ(q − 1)
q(1− θq)
1
qS
(C.34)
where in the steady state pI = 1 because Γ(1) = Γ′(1) = 0. The non-arbitrage
condition between short-term and long-term bonds in steady state implies
1
qS
=
1 + λqL
qL
(C.35)
The capital-labor ratio is
k
h
=
α
1− α
w
rK
(C.36)
Since in the steady state all firms charge the same price, p˜ = 1 and real marginal
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cost is equal to the inverse of markup
mc =
1
a
(
rK
α
)α(
w
1− α
)1−α
=
1
1 + δpi
(C.37)
Plugging these two equations into the production function at the steady state we
obtain the capital-output ratio which is a function of the rental rate of capital.
y
k
=
rK
α
(C.38)
Equation C.37 can be rewritten as a function of the rental rate
w = (1− α)
(
a
1 + δpi
) 1
1−α ( α
rK
) α
1−α
(C.39)
In the steady state, the real wage is equal to a markup over the marginal rate of
substitution between labor and consumption
w = (1 + δw)
ωhη
c−σ
(C.40)
Assuming that bS = 0 and considering k = s, the investment function in steady
state is
i = γ
rKk + (1 + λφqL)bL + δpi
1+δpi
y − t
1− θq (C.41)
The ratio of investment over capital is the depreciation rate
i
k
= δ (C.42)
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The resource constraint is
y = c+ i (C.43)
Finally, from the government budget constraint the steady state tax is
t =
[
(1 + λqL)− qL] bL (C.44)
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